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The diagonal lemma as the formalized Grelling paradox 1
Gyo¨rgy Sere´ny
Go¨del’s diagonal lemma (which is often referred to as fix-point or self-referential lemma) sum-
marizes very succinctly the ability of first-order arithmetic to ‘talk about itself’, a crucial prop-
erty of this system that plays a key role in the proof of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem and in
those of the theorems of Tarski and Church on the undefinability of truth and undecidability
of provability respectively. In fact, with the representability of provability at hand, these three
main limitative theorems of logic can be considered to be simple applications of the lemma
(cf. e.g. [2] pp. 227–231). Due to this central role, the proof of the lemma could shed light on the
very essence of these fundamental theorems. In spite of the fact that it is common knowledge
that Go¨del’s proof of the incompleteness theorem is closely related to the Liar paradox, the proof
of the lemma as it is presented in textbooks on logic is not self–evident to say the least. Indeed,
in the Handbook of Proof Theory, the proof of the lemma is introduced by the following remark
(see [1], p.119): ‘This proof [is] quite simple but rather tricky and difficult to conceptualize.’ Or
to quote another opinion, ‘The brevity of the proof does not make for transparency; it has the
aura of a magician’s trick’ (cf. [4], p. 1). It seems, therefore, that the words of a respected logician
reflect a widespread attitude to the proof of the lemma (see [5]): ‘[This] result is a cornerstone
of modern logic. [...] You would hope that such a deep theorem would have an insightful proof.
No such luck. [...] I don’t know anyone who thinks he has a fully satisfying understanding of
why the Self-referential Lemma works. It has a rabbit-out-of-a-hat quality for everyone.’
In view of these remarks, we think that it is worth drawing attention to a possibility of making
the proof of the lemma completely transparent by showing that it is simply a straightforward
translation of the Grelling paradox into first-order arithmetic.2
Notation
Our formal language is that of first-order arithmetic. Q stands for Robinson arithmetic while ω
is the set of natural numbers. g is any one of the standard Go¨del numberings and Fmn is the
set of formulas with all free variables among the first n ones. For the sake of simplicity, we shall
denote the closed terms corresponding to natural numbers by the numbers themselves. Further,
N denotes the set of Go¨del numbers of formulas in Fm1. Finally, the result of substituting a
term t for the only free variable of a formula ϕ ∈ Fm1 is denoted by ϕ(t).
Diagonal lemma
For any formula ϕ ∈ Fm1, there is a sentence λ such that
Q ⊢ λ←→ ϕ(g(λ)) .
Proof idea
First we show how to construct, out of Grelling’s paradox, an ordinary language sentence that, on
the one hand, says of itself that it has a given property, on the other hand, consists of components
with easily identifiable formal first-order counterparts. The straightforward formalization of this
ordinary language sentence leads to the desired formal sentence (as can be expected since the
lemma is just about the existence of a first-order sentence that, informally speaking, says of
itself that it has a given property).
As is well known, the Grelling paradox consists in the fact that the sentence
(1) ‘heterological’ is heterological3
shares with the Liar sentence the remarkable property that its truth implies its own falsity and
vice versa, i.e., in effect, says of itself that it is false. What is truly important is that, contrary
to the Liar, this paradoxical sentence achieves self-reference without using an indexical.4
1To appear in the series Collegium Logicum of the Kurt Go¨del Society in 2006.
2The train of thought below is an application of the ideas given in [6] to first-order arithmetic.
3An adjective is called heterological if the property denoted by the adjective does not hold for the adjective
itself; e.g. ‘long’, ‘German’, ‘monosyllabic’ are heterological.
4As to the notion of heterologicality itself (which actually involves self-reference), its slightly modified version
can also be expressed without using an indexical: replace ‘it’ by ‘x’ in (3) below.
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Since our aim is to construct a sentence that (a) is not about an adjective but about a sentence
and (b) instead of asserting its own falsehood, says of itself that it has an arbitrary (but fixed)
property, we have to slightly modify (1) accordingly. In order to satisfy the first requirement,
in place of an adjective A, we consider the open sentence ‘x is A’. Obviously, in this case, the
transformation corresponding to the application of an adjective A to a linguistic object O will
be the substitution of the name of O 5 for the variable x in the open sentence corresponding
to A. Consequently, the sentence associated with the self-application of any adjective A in this
way is “ ‘x is A’ is A”. In particular, the counterpart of (1) is:
(2) ‘x is heterological’ is heterological.
Note that the notion of heterologicality occurring here is already a property of open sentences
with single variables. Since, on the one hand, to be heterological is to have the property that
its application to itself yields a false sentence, on the other, as we noted above, in the case of
sentences, ‘applied to itself’ means ‘its name is substituted for the variable in it’, for any open
sentence x with a single variable, we have
(3) x is heterological just in case the sentence obtained by substituting the name of x for
the variable in it is false.
Finally, if we replace ‘being false’ by ‘having property p’, (2) and (3) together yield:
(4) the sentence obtained by substituting the name of ‘the sentence obtained by substi-
tuting the name of x for the variable in it has property p’ for the variable in it has
property p.
It can directly be checked that this sentence indeed says of itself that it has property p (and
says nothing else) since it is built up in such a way that if we perform the substitution described
in it, then we obtain the sentence itself, which is stated to have property p.6 Now, let s denote
the open sentence between the quotation marks in (4):
the sentence obtained by substituting the name of x for the variable in it has property p.
Then, clearly, the whole sentence (4) is s(‘s’).7 That is, the formalization process should consist
of two steps. In the first step we have to find the formal version η ∈ Fm1 of s, and then the
second step is obvious: the desired sentence λ will simply be η(g(η)).8
Proof
Let ϕ ∈ Fm1 be arbitrary and let its informal counterpart be the open sentence ‘x has property
p’.9 Certainly, x(g(x)) is the formal version of the phrase
the sentence obtained by substituting the name of x for the variable in it,
and hence ϕ
(
g[x(g(x))]
)
is the formal version of s. Clearly, ϕ
(
g[x(g(x))]
)
with a variable x
running over formulas in Fm1
10 is not a formula itself, it becomes a formula only if we replace
the variable x by a formula. Therefore, we cannot continue the formalization process unless
we find a formula that can play the role of ϕ
(
g[x(g(x))]
)
, that is, a formula η ∈ Fm1 such
that η(g(ψ)) is provably equivalent in Q to ϕ
(
g[ψ(g(ψ))]
)
for every ψ ∈ Fm1, or equivalently
(denoting the inverse of g by g−1), for any n ∈ N ,
Q ⊢ η(n)←→ ϕ
(
g[g−1(n)(n)]
)
.
In order to find the appropriate formula η, let us consider the expression substituted into the
formula ϕ, and define the function f : ω −→ ω accordingly:
f(n) = g[g−1(n)(n)] if n ∈ N and f(n) = 0 otherwise.
5Following the common practice, we define the name of a linguistic object to be the object itself between
quotation marks.
6J.N. Findlay used sentences of the same structure to examine informally the incompleteness theorem (cf. [3]).
7Mimicking the formal notation, in the case of any common language open sentence o having a single variable,
we abbreviate the result of substituting a linguistic phrase q for the variable in o by o(q).
8Go¨del numbering is, of course, the formal counterpart of naming.
9It is obvious that the formulas in Fm1 are formal versions of open sentences with single variables asserting the
possession of a property, and, taking into consideration only those informal concepts that have formal counterparts,
the formalization of attributing a property to an object is the substitution of the formal name (i.e. the Go¨del
number) of the corresponding formal object for the only free variable of the formula that formalizes the open
sentence asserting the possession of the property concerned.
10Recall that, in s, the variable x runs over the set of open sentences with single variables.
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Since this function is obviously recursive and hence representable in Q, and, up to provable
equivalence in Q, the result of substituting a representable function into a formula can also be
expressed by a formula,11 there is a formula η ∈ Fm1 such that, for any n ∈ N ,
(5) Q ⊢ η(n)←→ ϕ(f(n)) .
Thus we have obtained what we need, we have shown that there exists an η ∈ Fm1 that can
be considered to be the formal version of s. Now, all that remains to do is straightforward: it
follows from (5) that, for every ψ ∈ Fm1,
Q ⊢ η(g(ψ)) ←→ ϕ
(
g[ψ(g(ψ))]
)
,
which, in turn, choosing ψ to be η, yields
Q ⊢ η(g(η)) ←→ ϕ
(
g[η(g(η))]
)
,
showing that the sentence λ = η(g(η)) indeed has the desired property.12
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11By elementary first-order logic, it follows from the definition of representability that if a function f : ω −→ ω
is represented in Q by a formula µ ∈ Fm2, then, for any ϕ ∈ Fm1 and n ∈ ω,
Q ⊢ (∃y)(µ(n, y) ∧ ϕ(y))←→ ϕ(f(n)).
12Perhaps it is worth noting that the informal version of the last step in the formal proof explains the reasons
why s (the informal counterpart of η) is suitable for constructing the appropriate self-referring sentence (4).
Actually, by definition, for any open sentence o with a single variable, s(‘o’) says that o(‘o’) has property p. In
the particular case when o is just s, we obtain: s(‘s’) says that s(‘s’) has property p.
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